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Before presenting my views on a somewhat controversial 
subject in the field of intellectual property, I would like to 
share with you some thoughts on the communication crisis in the 
legal profession. 
If communication is defined as expression that is clearly 
and easily understood, much of the written and oral expression of 
the legal profession simply fails to measure up to the 
definition. Inability to communicate afflicts all segments of 
the profession and is now pervasive enough to be classified as a 
crisis. It deserves ,your attention because the effective 
transmission of information, thoughts, ideas and knowledge is 
just as essential to the efficient operation of our legal system 
as it is to progress in the arts and sciences. Ineffective 
expression in leg~! ~iscou~se diminishes the service of the bar, 
impedes the resolution of disputes, retards legal progress and 
growth and, ultimately, undermines the rule of law. The 
expressive deficiencies of lawyers must be recognized as a 
serious and growing problem. The problem does not seem to be as 
widespread among the members of the Intellectual Property Bar. 
Perhaps that is because of the nature of your work. This is not 
to say that communication problems are entirely unknown among 
you, however. 
In one sense, the legal profession merely reflects a 
communication crisis in the society at large. We are surrounded 
by doubletalk. Consider these examples, collected from recent 
newspaper reports: 
Doctors at a Philadelphia hospital described a patient's 
death as a "diagnostic misadventure of a high magnitude .. " 
Five thousand workers at a Chrysler plant found out that a 
new "career alternative enhancement program" meant their plant 
was closing and they were out of jobs. 
A stockbroker described the October 13th stock market crash 
as a "fourth quarter equity retreat." 
A United States Senator referred to capital punishment as 
"our society's recognition of the sanctity of human life." 
What I do not understand is why lawyers tolerate doubletalk 
and inarticulateness in speech and writing. Twenty years ago, 
the National District Attorneys Association, of which I was then 
a member, held its annual conference in New York City. During 
the conference, we had a luncheon speaker who was introduced as a 
member of the United Nations legal staff specializing in criminal 
matters. I recognized him as a local comedian and doubletalk 
artist~ About ten minutes into his meaningless spiel, a 
prosecutor from Georgia sitting next to me leaned over and said: 
"Ah cain't understand a lot of what thet ol' boy is sayin'." I 
replied: "You can't understand anything of what he is saying, 
because he is speakii:g doubletalk." "Isn't that somethin'?" he 
said, "Ah just tho't he had a real bad New York accent." 
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Consider these facts: failure to communicate is near the top 
of the list of complaints made by clients about their lawyers. 
Law firms have begun to hire public relations counsel to speak to 
the public for them and to advise them on how to communicate with 
the press. The employers of newly admitted lawyers have found it 
necessary to provide them with teachers of English grammar, style 
and usage. Lawyer-to-lawyer and lawyer-to-client communication 
often is incomprehensible. Lawyer communication in the trial 
courtroom frequently is silly, and I am here to tell you that 
appellate occasion_~~·- just 
exchanges that 
in 
Q. Doctor, did you say he was shot in the woods? 
A. No, I said he was shot in the lumbar region. 
Q. Now, Mrs. Johnson, how was your first marriage 
terminated? 
A. By death. 
Q. And by whose death was it terminated? 
Q. What is your name? 
A. Ernestine McDowell. 
Q. And what is your marital status? 
A. Fair. 
Q. What happened then? 
A. He told me, he says, "I have to kill you because 
you can identify me." 
Q. Did he kill you? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you married? 
A. No, I am divorced. 
Q. What did your husband do before you divorced him? 
A. A lot of things that I didn't know about. 
Q. At the time you first saw Dr. McCarty, had you ever 
seen him prior to that time? 
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Q. Now I am going to show you what has been marked as 
~~'ax:e:=s Exhibit No. 2 and ask if you recognize the 
picture. 
A. John Fletcher. 
Q. That's you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were present when the picture was taken, 
right? 
Q. Mr. Jones, is your appearance this morning pursuant 
to a deposition notice which I sent to your 
attorney? 
A. No. This is how I dress when I go to work. 
Q. And lastly, Gary, all your responses must be oral. 
Okay? What school do you go to? 
A. Oral. 
Q. How old are you? 
A.. Oral. 
As for appellate advocacy, it is the rare briefwriter, in my 
experience, who seizes the opportunity to employ the clarity, 
simplicity and directness of expression necessary to endow a 
brief with maximum persuasive force. I often think of the pro se 
litigant who referred to himself throughout his brief and in his 
oral argument before us as "your despondent." He was the 
petitioner, actually, and we were despondent. I bring this 
message on communications to you as a matter of self-defense. I 
hope that it will encourage those of you who brief and argue 
appeals to bear in mind that your object is persuasion and your 
only means to achieve that goal is communication. 
I turn now to my proposal for a change in the law of fair 
use. Regardless of what I would like to law to be, I am bound by 
statute and precedent to apply the law as it is. My remarks 
should not be taken in any other way. 
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EXPLOITING STOLEN TEXT: FAIR USE OR FOUL PLAY?* 
Roger J. Miner** 
The doctrine of fair use in copyright law presently permits 
the exploitation of unpublished, copyrighted text stolen from an 
author or one in lawful possession. This anomaly in the law is a 
creature of the Copyright Act 1 and should be eliminated by 
appropriate statutory amendment. The outright theft of 
intellectual property ought not to be condoned by Congress. In 
any case where an author has not published or publicly 
disseminated his or her copyrighted material, there simply is no 
reason to allow the use of that material without the author's 
consent. 
In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir William 
Blackstone described the rights of authors in their original 
compositions as a "species of property grounded in labour and 
invention." 2 The rule in 1766 England, according to Blackstone, 
was that 
[w]hen a man by the exertion of his 
rational powers has produced an 
original work, he has clearly a 
right to dispose of that identical 
work as he pleases, and any attempt 
to take it from him, or vary the 
disposition he has made of it, is 
an invasi~n of his right of 
property. 
Copyright was recognized in the common law as well as by the 
Statute of Anne, 4 which, according to Blackstone, provided 
"additional penalties 115 to protect the property of authors and 
their assigns for a term of years. 
(.;.~~1..a,,a;~~~¥-··~~~.ew~'1r·~~~r·""~··iliiF~t--Yl!iil~·"l!fi"i1:~@:1'ls··'·····1:!>~~"fr'1t·f'.>·:t~·1'.·n.·et···· ·the.,invas ion·<::>f · ··authors ' 
j propert:·y· .. ··r.i:·ghts,,. .. ~. · . J:;t;,., •. ii·S····· inte:i:::esting to note that Blacks tone.1 in ..
. examining .... the .. "law. o.f.1.arceny.,. found that ''w:hen property 
any violation ef· that property is subjeet ·to 
be punished by the laws of society.~,] 
The right to make some reasonable use of published, 
copyrighted material long has been recognized in the English 
cases. "Fair abridgement," as it then was called, was permitted 
early on, despite the difficulties experienced by courts in 
coping with the concept. 8 However, the common law rights of 
authors to control first publication always were considered 
separate and distinct from any rules pertaining to statutory 
autho;r; ..... o .. £ .. ·unpublished compositions, which· depend entixely upan 
2 
In the United States, Congress first exercised its 
constitutional authority to "secur[e] for limited Times to 
Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 1110 
when it enacted the first copyright statute in 1790. 11 In Folsom 
v. Marsh, 12 Justice Story formulated the first definitive 
statement on fair use in Americ 
l,e.t.te;,;.g .. M·•e£.,··Gee:t:ge,,.washi·n~1'.;;eft'·"··4:·a'" a .... two.,.,.v.o,1··\::lmew··WO·ti:;:·k""'•·G>ft····W.ashington 
.wr.~:t..e.~···by"··Re:v; .•. "Char l es···· Upham·it ··· The·1"•l·e·~·t·e·r·s ·WElre ..... c O·pie·d>·f·rem" ·the 
;t,welll~.:Jlolume. work .. of .. Ja.red. Sp.arks."" who· orig·inally edi ted1 1 
,copy,righted and ··published them. Sparks· and Chief Justice 
Mars.har1·1· had· obta·i·ned the letters .. from . .,,JusJ:.iceh ..... ~~·shrod· 
"',.W»a~,.bing:to.n..,,h.nephew·····of· ·the""····f·irs·t····president.. In his opinion, 
Just.ice .story discussed the justifiaale .. use.s .of ... c.opyrighted works 
a-a.G-~lz.e.~-··~-~e~·~·-·~··+·~co.ns~,,, .. ~~"'de .. t.e~i:·rt±·ng""" 
whe~fl:e~~·"6·he•~···h~··bee.n.,, .. al1r···.in"~·~in(:jement"'r"'''''Thos·&···"i!ae·'t;;or·s····--····t·};;}.e 
natu.t:,e,_,and,., .. ab'3,eet,&.,··&,:f!··~'E~h:e·.,,·se1eG.t.ions ... made·r·"·4:.,,hs., .. "!a.ant:1i:t:y"'·and···vai·uie 
·o.£ ..... the.H ... materials .. usecl:·,~·and··the· de<3ree· in·which the· use· may .. 
pr:e.~di,~.e .. '··t.he.,..sa1er·Olr· diminish,...·the··prefit:s .. 1···or ·supersede ·the 
S·fi>jec.ts .. o:f,, the original wo,rk:.1J , .... _ were to be echoed in the 
Copyright Act of 1976. 14 
The distinction between common law and statutory copyright 
protection was carried over to American law from the law of 
England. 15 Common law copyright attached to a work from creation 
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to publication or dissemination, and was enforceable in the state 
courts. 16 As was true under British law, the defense of fair use 
was not considered applicable to unpublished material. 17 The 
1976 Copyright Act changed all that. Or so it seemed. Common 
law copyright, often referred to as the right of first 
publication, was preempted by the new statute. 18 The doctrine of 
fair use was codified and made applicable for the first time to 
all copyrighted work, published and unpublished, without 
distinction. According to the Act, "fair use of a copyrighted 
work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching ... , scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. " 19 In determining whether the use 
made of a work in a particular case is fair, courts are 
constrained to consider four factors: purpose and character of 
the use; nature of the copyrighted work; amount and 
substantiality of the portion used; and effect of the use on the 
potential market for the copyrighted work. 20 
A persuasive case is made in the leading treatise on fair 
use for the proposition "that Congress intended to continue the 
common law prohibition against fair use of unpublished but not 
voluntarily disseminated works. " 21 There is, of course, no 
specific statutory language supporting the proposition, which is 
founded in a review of the legislative history of the 1976 Act. 
The legislative history referred to is derived from the reports 
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of several committees of Congress, including one expressing a 
congressional intent to "restate the present judicial doctrine of 
fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way. 11 22 
The treatise refers to this and other evidence as providing 
support for the notion that the fair use doctrine is intended to 
apply only to unpublished works that are publicly disseminated, 
the same as at common law. 23 Apparently, public dissemination is 
thought to involve a deliberate choice to make a work available 
to others, short of actual publication. The public performance 
of unpublished plays and an author's delivery of an unpublished 
manuscript to a critic are given as examples of voluntary 
dissemination. 24 Publication is defined by statute as "the 
distribution of copies ... of a work to the public" as well as 
"[t]he offering to distribute copies ... to a group of persons 
for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or 
pub 1 ic dis p 1 ay . . . . "'·~·l.,i.G,•ype~~~~ma:fte•ec.!' orm·dispJ:ay·"•'O''.E"•<•a,·wo:r** 
dc:)eS'"d··not··· of' its e1 :f constitute pub lie a:"'tion··i'· .. it.~"~···· ······T.he" distinc-tier:b 
:Between ·publicatien and public disseminat:ion· .i:s·· ve·r'Y'/ slight 
in dee&~·"" 
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 26 
the Supreme Court was presented with a clear opportunity to 
eliminate unpublished works from the reach of fair use. That it 
did not do so was attributable solely to the language of the 
Copyright Act. Unquestioned in Harper & Row was the trial 
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court's finding that the defendant "knowingly exploited a 
purloined manuscript." 27 The manuscript in question was, of 
course, the memoirs of President Ford. 
we~e,,.,scheduled to ... appea.r Time magazine one week before the 
book was to be distributed by the plainti 
pubLL.shing house. Before either scheduled event transpired, 
.aimple theft allowed the defendant to print and distribute the 
wox:d,s._.ct£,President Ford, describing the pardon of Richard Nixon, 
.l.i H~'"·.J..,i:..~~""'i~:uoi ... a...c~ a1i:i.drEH'Jtr'·'""'"''·''':ll:'ft· r€~¥E~·r·lEY:i:·neir''''0't::·n~~"'''"'8·eet!>'RE:!.i··· 1~~rEFU·~L.:t: Cour·~· 
Appeewl"8'·"~and··ho 1 dinq· the···· p la:int.i :f~·· en{'.;. i tleGl to·. dama geS··r· the· Court;;,..,, 
coa&~ded·· "that the unpublished· nature of·· a· work is ' (a] key, 
though. not necessarily determinative, factor' tending to negate·, a 
defEMlS~ of fair use·':'*.!"~ Al though the Court analyzed the facts of 
the case in terms of the four statutory fair use factors, it held 
that "(u]nder ordinary circumstances, the author's right to 
control the first public appearance of his undisseminated 
expression will outweigh a claim of fair use. 1129 I suggest that 
the vague and undefined phrase, "under ordinary circumstances," 
leaves open a window that should be closed by Congress. The 
window is open only because the Copyright Act presently makes no 
distinction for fair use purposes between copyrighted material 
that is published or disseminated and copyrighted material that 
is unpublished or undisseminated. It is a window through which a 
thief may enter. 
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In the wake of Harper & Row, the courts have been faced with 
some thorny problems in deciding whether various uses of 
unpublished, copyrighted material were used fairly within the 
intendment of the Copyright Act. For example, in Salinger v. 
Random House, Inc., 30 a case involving the copying of letters of 
J.D. Salinger by a biographer who gained access to the letters by 
promising not to copy them, the appeals court panel puzzled over 
the "ambiguity arising from the Supreme Court's observation that 
'the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished 
works.'" 31 The conclusion was that the Court meant it was less 
likely that fair use would apply to unpublished than published 
matter, and not merely that a lesser quantity of material may be 
copied in the case of unpublished matter. 
RG~(iip,.~;,~!\.~"'"·a~·,.·,,·±E~clf~.t;.···. some.of the b·i0grapher' s copying''' was· mC>tivated 
by a"''2.,ds.s4:rr:e to avoid writing what he·' called· "pedestrian 
sent:eRcefs]. " 3? If y0u can lift the word images and, stylistic 
device.sof.J .• D .. Salinger., why b0ther creatring:ycmr own~ 
The extensive use of an unpublished paper "purloined from 
the Princeton library 1133 presented a District Judge with yet 
another twist in the defense 0f fair use. A copy 0f the paper, 
dealing with the Pahlevi restoration in Iran, arrived at the 
library as part of the files of Allen Dulles, to whom it was sent 
by the author. Researchers at the library were afforded notice 
of possible liability for c0pyright infringement and agreed that 
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permiss to reproduce was required. The user claimed-~~~.~~ 
VJY-6.-. •••. ~ ............. ,""""""'~·''~''"Mc-"'*'·V ........ ~ ...... 4-11..., . .,,.,,, .. , .•.. Q,o4>·'"""''""'' pa.rt··S of. the.····author's · 'l"'\.::li"l"'\t::l~·~···· 
:to pr.ovide his book with an '_'air of authenticity" and '.'fu·ll 
He contended als.Q; that the "ordinary circumstances" 
rule did not apply because the paper copied was fact rather than 
fiction, the author of the paper had given copies to certain 
persons, and the paper and the book were designed to serve 
different purposes. 35 The district court rejected all these 
contentions, applied the statutory fair use factors and found the 
user liable for infringement. 
An action to enjoin the publication of the biography of L. 
Ron Hubbard, deceased founder of the Church of Scientology, 
presented another occasion for an attempt to define further the 
imprecise parameters of the doctrine of fair use as it pertains 
to unpublished material. The material was the product of the pen 
of Hubbard himself, and the unpublished writings in question, a 
certain diary in particular, were almost certainly acquired from 
the Church of Scientology by misappropriation or conversion. 36 
Although the district court ultimately decided to award damages 
for infringement, it accepted the infringer's contention that 
there is greater justification in using unpublished work to make 
a point about the character of the work's author (as was the case 
in the Hubbard biography) than to display the distinctiveness of 
a writing style (as was the case in the Salinger biography). 
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In dictum, the panel majority of the appeals court found the 
distinction between use to enliven text and use to communicate 
certain traits of character "unnecessary and unwarranted:" the 
biography clearly was a work of criticism, scholarship or 
research, the purpose of use factor therefore weighed in favor 
the copier, and this distinction was considered superfluous. 37 
!EGunQ.~,.sJ:..gni:t,ieanee··,·i~"····t:·he-~~·ae.~ ... t;.ha,t.~-·,:t·h·Er····,Su·preme··Hottr·~·~···n"eve~·· ···ha>S 
~p~e'S':ly·-·rej'e"eted·"··t:':he·'""''"·di·s·ti·net::·ie·n·····betwe·en"'"''·c·opy:i:fHJ.,,··e*pr.ess·ion····t"O 
1··e:aJ:.i~eB~···t:her·copier' s prose and· daing so where·· necessar~,,..1;e··· re.par~ 
0·a··£·~.a.QGurat.e±y···and··f:ai·r·~~~J~8 As the author of the panel 
majority opinian and the opinion concurring in the denial of 
rehearing in bane, I cantinue to "question whether judges, rather 
than literary critics, should decide whether literary material is 
used to enliven text or demonstrate truth." 39 In my opinion, 
"[i]t is far too easy for one author to use another author's work 
on the pretext it is copied for the latter purpase rather than 
the former. 1140 The issue is not yet definit~ly resolved in the 
Second Circuit because affirmance of the judgment of the district 
court in the case, New Era Publications v. Henry Holt & Co., was 
based on laches, rather than on the type of use to which the 
converted material was put. 41 
Certain elements af the intellectual property bar hold the 
firm belief that the window of fair use should be opened even 
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wider than permitted by Harper & Row for access to unpublished 
and undisseminated material. These elements apparently are not 
at all of fended by the notion of exploiting a manuscript pilfered 
by a burglar from an author's locked desk drawer, provided the 
exploitation furthers a just and worthy cause. That federal 
judges are intended to decide what causes are good and just 
should be a matter of some concern. Many critics base their 
positions on First Amendment arguments. One commentator has 
written that "[t]he nature of the accomodation [sic] between 
copyright principles and First Amendment principles remains to be 
drafted. 1142 Yet the Supreme Court in Harper & Row noted "that 
copyright's idea/expression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional 
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by 
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an 
author's expression.'" 43 The commentator merely chooses to 
disregard the accommodation already identified by the Supreme 
Court. 
The authors of an article describing the doctrine of fair 
use as "the biographer's bane" condemn the severe limitations on 
copying unpublished works protected by copyright as a "dangerous 
rule of interpretation. " 44 They refer to language in Salinger 
"unpublished works . . . normally enjoy complete protection 
against copying any protected expression" 45 -- as an 
"overstatement 1146 of the Harper & Row standard: "[u]nder 
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ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the first 
public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh 
a claim of fair use .. 1147 It is difficult to discern how the 
language in Salinger is anything other than a restatement of the 
standard in Harper & Row. The same authors find much to 
criticize in New Era, finding that it "ignore[s] the explicit 
congressional mandate that the equities must be flexibly balanced 
case by case 1148 in favor of elevating the single fact of 
unpublished status "to an almost insurmountable obstacle to a 
successful fair use defense."~ But there is nothing in New Era 
to indicate that the congressional mandate to apply the fair use 
factors in the case of unpublished works is to be ignored. There 
is merely a reiteration of the principle that the unpublished 
nature of a work is to weigh heavily in the balance and a 
faithful adherence to the "under ordinary circumstances" language 
employed by the Supreme Court. 
-~~-- sJ1re~"''"'6:1'\""""'e*a·~~9'~~~~"'~'a:yf'""''"'tr&«"·de~'"""orte 
"·Gemmen:ta.to.;,;,r. ,that" 1'"fht·±ographers ··are·now .. v:ir·=~HiHl:-l·±Y""fi::H::e&l·l:lded···· from 
.publ,i~llin(j con:vincinq1 ···crit·.±cal··portra±ts···"·backed···up·· by ... limited 
·use ... 0£ .. fthe. subject rs unpublishea, writings .... t.o ..... r.ebu,t. .... a.,t.OQ·.,polishe(i; 
·publ~i~kpeJ;sona. ". 50 It simply is an incorrect statement of law to 
say, as does ~~same~commentator, that we have come to a point 
"where property rights -- albeit intellectual property rights 
em.bodied in the Copyright Act, which protects the manner of 
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expression of ideas or facts, takes precedence over the First 
Amendment, which prevents the monopolization or privatization of 
facts or ideas." 51 The Supreme Court has held specifically that 
the protections of the First Amendment are "already embodied in 
the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression 
and uncopyrightable facts and ideas." 52 As to the fair use 
doctrine in particular, the commentator candidly concedes as 
accurate the statement that the '"doctrine encompasses all claims 
of first amendment in the copyright field,'" 53 but disagrees 
with it. Even so, it is difficult to know why he considers that 
a "chill wind now blows through ... editorial offices," 54 in 
view of the unlimited right to use facts and ideas, published and 
unpublished, copyrighted and uncopyrighted; the limited right to 
use copyrighted, published material, and the severely limited 
right to use copyrighted, unpublished material. My thesis is 
that the delicate balance between the public interest and private 
rights should be restored by a return to earlier law through the 
total elimination of the right to the fair use of material that 
is unpublished or undisseminated. 
An understanding of this thesis requies an examination of 
the policy underlying copyright law and the doctrine of fair use. 
The Supreme Court teaches that the purpose of copyright is to 
stimulate creativity for the public good through the incentive of 
a fair return for an author's labor. 55 The concept of advancing 
12 
the public welfare by encouraging individual effort through 
personal gain is said to drive the Patents and Copyrights clause 
of the Constitution. 56 The Supreme Court reminds us "that the 
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free 
expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of 
one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to 
create and disseminate ideas." 57 The fair use doctrine, 
described as an "equitable rule of reason, 1158 was developed by 
the courts to provide some elasticity in situations where the 
copyright law might tend to inhibit authors from creating new 
works by building on older works. Strict application of 
copyright in such situations would defeat incremental progress, 
to the detriment of the public good. My colleague, Judge Posner, 
suggests that Shakespeare, who was known to borrow plot, 
character and actual language from existing works, might be 
stifled by our copyright law. 59 Positing a return to the theory 
of creative imitation of Shakespeare's day, Judge Posner notes 
that the extensive expansion of fair use that would be required 
not only would be difficult to define but would very adversely 
affect the author whose work was used. 60 Although he finds 
thriving literature before there was such a thing as copyright, 
the reasons he gives for the phenomenon -- the low cost of 
writing, non-monetary rewards, and the high cost of copying 
have little relevance to modern times. 61 
13 
·Ne>t·· unex:pectedlyr · ·an 
.advocated that ncongress 
. and disapprov.ai .. of .... the. L;e!(;;;t::H1ibc······ . .t.u·:1.:.·:r..1;-1t;11·o··•f·······J~t5·"""1:1::"1>.1:·.L·.1:·.;.1o;·"'·*""'·~· 
·w.itft.,,·""t·he··Nation case1whieh···devia'E·e· so 0 far from 
and." .. nistory a.re. and necessarilyought. to .. be writtenr" 
Nat.;i.QJ;l,~ .. s. .. speeific· proposal was ... :t;g ... amend···the ·Copyriqh:t Acrt"···t.0·"' 
·· pre~ .. that· !'unpublished material shall ·be ·t.reated the .same 
.as· :published works have heretofore bee·n t:re·ated" for fair·· ase 
.pur~~-.-.-Apparently, it would make no di.fference to The". 
Na·tio.n whethe.r or not the unpublished material~· was stolen.. The .. 
·statu.tory amendment proposed in t:he· editorial, contrary; tG its 
purpo;i;;ted goal, would not serve the publicpurpGsebecause 
would .. not encourage. the efforts of authors·. That an unpublished.,,.. 
undii!Mi1eminated, copyrighted work is of· hi.storical signifieance,,, 
an~"·""'·Eieserving of unfettered publ.:ie diseussion.!1• 64 does not mean 
that····.,:.h·he public may take from that··.,woJ!ilf: whateve~·"'··i·t···w .. .i.L.•;;L:'".:1!~··111··,,.·· 
As has been demonstrated, the present "open window" for fair 
use of unpublished material has given rise to much uncertainty. 
It allows for the exploitation of stolen text. It has spawned 
proposals for fair use analysis under market theory guidelines, 65 
redevelopment of the fair use doctrine predicated in part on a 
utopian theory, 66 and evaluation of the unpublished nature of 
14 
the work on a fact/fiction scale. 67 A rule that would disallow 
the exploitation of purloined work, dispel the uncertainty 
attributable to the open window, and eliminate the need to revise 
the doctrine of fair use as applied to unpublished works is a 
rule that prohibits absolutely any copying of unpublished or 
undisseminated works. 
It cannot be gainsaid that an author should have the right 
eft&.-4;h~~~y to "'ft<:~ft~~""'~J~ .•. g.~ .. -~~~~·fit:S., revise or discard 
his or her work prior to publication--~~~~~~~~~~-~ea~~ldr.J1:et~·~a·feo 
public dissemination 
Implicated 
in these rights are notions of privacy, 68 freedom to refrain from 
speaking, 69 and an author's control of his or her own material. 70 
If information can be considered property under certain 
circumstances, 71 an unpublished and undisseminated manuscript, 
duly copyrighted, should be considered the property of the author 
and subject to the protection of the law. 72 
To the argument that the copying of unpublished material 
must be allowed for reasons of public health, safety or 
welfare, 73 the short response is that copyright protection does 
not extend to any fact or idea embodied in a copyrighted work. 74 
To the assertion that the retention of unpublished, copyrighted 
papers for 50 to 100 years, 75 immune from fair use, is at "cross-
purposes" with the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 76 the 
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answer is the same. The freedom of access to facts and ideas is 
the history of democracy. The right of ownership in intellectual 
property quite another thing. Interestingly enough, it 
appears that an author whose work is protected under the 
recently-ratified Berne Convention 77 is entitled to protection 
from any use of an unpublished work. 78 
.-1c""'~"'"'*"'f~·· ·s·:Aa'±·•±"···ee"·uperm·:i::·s·s~·i,,:B·le,. .... t;o.Nmake···· 
... qu9't::at±ons··· f:£'!om····a work··which·· al:Eeady··has .be&n 
.n1ad~.av.a.iiahl.,e."".to .... the-· publie·r·~rovided····tha t 
tae.ir making····is compatible· with faiP-
.pr·act~cer·~ ai;.d. their ex.tent does not e~f eed 
· tha:t'" Just.1 f ied by the· purpose· . . . . 
,.1B~Li~hed-mate:z; .. i, ..a.1"' •. w..o:u.l4"·· se.e~·"·:ti~·····Be···e·He·±uded······f·~om .. .;,J1··f·ai~·· 
-p.J;actice.,.". and a violation of· ~·mo:raJ,•Y•·1!'.'igh1P...sJL ma¥ .be .. impLicated. 
,an~~~o.;t. ·SUGft· materiai·: BQ 
My thesis accounts for the concern of scholars that a denial 
of fair use for unpublished works would be "most inappropriate 
for the great majority of letters and memorabilia whose authors 
are no longer alive. 1181 It does so by allowing use of the 
factual content of letters and memorabilia.~ It also does so by 
deeming letters to be voluntarily disseminated to the public when 
they are received by the addressees. The generally accepted 
concept that the author of the letter retains the ownership of 
the intellectual property, while the recipient acquires ownership 
of the physical property, allows public display of the letter by 
the recipient. 83 There is no great leap in logic to consider 
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that, in writing and sending letters, authors have agreed to a 
dissemination of their correspondence to the public. Voluntary 
public dissemination was, of course, the same as publication for 
the purpose of losing the common law copyright protection that 
applied to unpublished matter under the old dual system of 
copyright. 84 Historians, as well as authors, scholars, 
journalists and researchers should have no quarre1 85 with a rule 
that permits the fair use of copyrighted letters, wherever such 
letters are found, to the same extent that they are afforded fair 
use of published or publicly disseminated matter. 
The Framers of our Constitution long ago foresaw the need to 
maintain balances in the republic they created: the balance 
between individual rights and public needs; the balance of 
authority between state and national governments; and the balance 
entailed in the separation of powers in the federal government. 
In the area of intellectual property, they foresaw a need to 
maintain a balance between the rights of authors and inventors 
and the rights of society. 86 They therefore empowered the 
Congress to establish and maintain that balance by assuring that 
writers and inventors have exclusive rights, but only for a 
limited time, in their writings and discoveries. The balance 
contemplated cannot be established or maintained unless Congress 
affords to authors the assurance that their copyrighted work 
cannot be used in any manner whatsoever prior to publication or 
voluntary and public disseminati_on. 
17 
FOOTNOTES 
* Copyright 1989, Roger J. Miner. All rights reserved. 
** Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second 
Circuit; Adjunct Professor, New York Law School. 
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
2. 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *405. 
3. Id. *405-06. 
4. The Statute of Anne, 8 Anne c. 19, cited in 2 W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries *407. This was the original copyright 
statute. W. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law 4-5 
(1985). 
5. 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *407. 
6. Id. 
7. 4 w. Blackstone, Commentaries *230. 
8. W. Patry, supra note 4, at 6-9. 
9. Prince Albert v. Strange, 1 Mac. & G. 25, 43 (1849), 
quoted in W. Patry, supra note 4, at 439. 
10. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
11. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, cited in 
Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 
1659, 1662 n.5 (1988). 
12. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901), cited in 
Fisher, supra note 11, at 1663 n.7. 
13. Id. at 348. 
14. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1982). 
15. W. Patry, supra note 4, at 439. 
16. Id. at 440. 
17. Goroff, Fair Use and Unpublished Works: Harper & Row 
v. Nation Enterprises, 9 Colum. J.L. & Arts 325, 329 (1985). 
18. 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, The Law of Copyright, § 
4.0l[B] (1989) [hereinafter Nimmer]. 
19. 17 u.s.c. § 107 (1982). 
20. . § 107(1)-(4). 
21. W. Patry, supra note 4, at 441-47. 
22. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 66, 
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.min. News 5659, 5680. 
23. See supra note 21. 
24. w. Patry, supra note 4, at 442; see also 2 Nimmer, 
supra note 18, § 8.ll[A], at 8-120.2 to 8-120.-3-.~ 
25. 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1982). 
26. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
27. Id. at 563 .. 
28. Id. at 554 (quoting S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 64 (1975)). 
29. Id. at 555. 
30. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 
(1987). 
31. Id. at 97 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564, and 
adding emphasis). 
32. Id. at 9 6. 
33. Love v. Kwitney, 706 F. Supp. 1123, 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) .. 
34. Id. at 1133. 
35. Id. at 1134. 
36. See New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt and Co., 
695 F. Supp. 1493, 1500 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 873 F.2d 576 
(2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989). 
37. New Era, 873 F.2d at 383. 
38. New Era, 884 F. 2d at __ , No. 88-7095, slip op. 5287, 
5295 (2d Cir. Aug. 29, 1989) (denial of rehearing in bane). 
39. Id. at __ , slip op. at 5290. 
40. Id. at __ , slip op. at 5290 .. 
41. 873 F .. 2d at 584-85 .. 
42. Abrams, The New Era Decision A New Era for 
Copyright?, N.Y.L.J., May 19, 1989, at 1, col. 1. 
43. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556. 
44. Goldberg & Bernstein, Fair Use The Biographer's 
Bane, N.Y.L.J., May 19, 1989, at 3, col. 2. 
45. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97. 
46. Goldberg & Bernstein, supra note 44, at 3, col. 3. 
47. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555. 
48. Goldberg & Bernstein, supra note 44, at 7, col. 3. 
49. Id. at 7, cols. 2-3. 
50. Wishingrad, Clear and Present 1st .Amendment Danger, 
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 22, 1989, at 2, cols. 3, 4. 
51. Id. at 2, col. 3. 
52. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560. 
53. Wishingrad, supra note 50, at 2, col. 4 (quoting New 
Era, 873 F.2d at 584). 
54. Id. at 2, col. 3. 
55. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 
156 (1978). 
56. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
57. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558. 
58. Sony Corp. of .America v. Universal City Studios, 464 
U.S. 417, 448 (1984) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 1, 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.min. News 
5659, 5679). 
59. R. Posner, Law and Literature 344 (1988). 
60. Id. at 351. 
61. Id. at 339. 
62. C Chaos, 1989, The Nation, June 5, 1989, at 759, 760. 
63. Id. 
64. Note, Fair Use of Copyrighted Work Under Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 415, 427 
(1986). 
65. See Note, Fair Use in Copyright Law and the Nonprofit 
Corporation::- A Proposal for Reform, 34 Am. U.L. Rev. 1327, 1363 
(1985). 
66. See Fisher, supra note 11, at 1780. 
67. See Dratler, Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use 
in Copyright Law, 43 u. Miami L. Rev. 233, 339 (1988). 
68. Newman, Manges Lecture , 12 Colum. J.L. & Arts 459 
(1988) .. 
69. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559. 
70. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1989, at Al, col. 5, at A36, col. 
6 .. 
71. See Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus 
and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual 
Property Law?, 38 Cath. U.L. Rev. 365 (1989). 
72. See, ~, MacGregor v. Watts, 254 A.D. 904, 5 N.Y.S.2d 
525 (2d Dep't 1938) (manuscripts of plays, at least one of which 
was copyrighted, held subject to conversion). 
73. Goroff, supra note 17, at 348. 
74. 17 u.s.c. § 102(b) (1982). 
75. See 17 u.s.c. § 302 (1982). 
76. Copyright Suit Reveals Unusual 2d Circuit Rift On Issue 
of 'Fair Use', N.Y.L.J., Sept. 8, 1989, at 1, col. 1, at 2, col. 
5. 
77. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2857. 
78. Kernochan, Protection of Unpublished Works in the 
United States Before and After the Nation Case, 33 J. Copyright 
Soc'y of U.S.A. 322, 331 (1986). 
79. Berne Convention, July 24, 1971, art. 10, reprinted in 
4 Nimmer, supra note 18, at App. 27-1, 27-8. 
80. Baumgarten & Meyer, Effects of U.S. Adherence to the 
Berne Convention, 37 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 462, 464 
(1989). 
81. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 597 Before the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate 
Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 645 (1967) (comment of 
American Historical Association), quoted in W. Patry, supra note 
4, at 444-45. 
82. Judge Downplays Decisions on Copyright Fair-Use Law, 
Conn. L. Tribune, July 3, 1989, at 13, col. 1, at 15, col. 1 
(citing speech by Judge Newman). 
83. 1 Nimmer, supra note 18, § 5.04. 
84. M. Epstein, Modern Intellectual Property 96 n.5 (1986). 
85. But see Copyright Ruling Creates Furor, Nat'l L.J., May 
15, 1989, at 3, cols. 2, 5. 
86. Note, Copyright Infringement: Applying the "Fair Use" 
Doctrine, 10 J. Marshall L. Rev. 134, 137 (1985). 
EXPLOITING STOLEN TEXT: FAIR USE OR FOUL PLAY?* 
Roger J. Miner** 
The doctrine of fair use in copyright law presently permits 
the exploitation of unpublished, copyrighted text stolen from an 
author or one in lawful possession. This anomaly in the law is a 
creature of the Copyright Act 1 and should be eliminated by 
appropriate statutory amendment. The outright theft of 
intellectual property ought not to be condoned by Congress. In 
any case where an author has not published or publicly 
disseminated his or her copyrighted material, there simply is no 
reason to allow the use of that material without the author's 
consent. 
In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir William 
Blackstone described the rights of authors in their original 
compositions as a "species of property grounded in labour and 
invention." 2 The rule in 1766 England, according to Blackstone, 
was that 
(w]hen a man by the exertion of his 
rational powers has produced an 
original work, he has clearly a 
right to dispose of that identical 
work as he pleases, and any attempt 
to take it from him, or vary the 
disposition he has made of it, is 
an invasi~n of his right of 
property. 
Copyright was recognized in the common law as well as by the 
Statute of Anne, 4 which, according to Blackstone, provided 
"additional penalties 115 to protect the property of authors and 
their assigns for a term of years. On the equity side, courts of 
chancery granted injunctions prohibiting the invasion of authors' 
property rights. 6 It is interesting to note that Blackstone, in 
examining the law of larceny, found that "when property is 
established, . any violation of that property is subject to 
be punished by the laws of society." 7 
The right to make some reasonable use of published, 
copyrighted material long has been recognized in the English 
cases. "Fair abridgement," as it then was called, was permitted 
early on, despite the difficulties experienced by courts in 
coping with the concept. 8 However, the common law rights of 
authors to control first publication always were considered 
separate and distinct from any rules pertaining to statutory 
copyright, including the doctrine of fair use. In affirming an 
injunction against the publication of a catalogue of etchings 
made by Prince Albert and Queen Victoria and obtained without 
their consent, the Lord Chancellor held that "abridgements, 
translations, extracts, and criticisms of public works ... all 
depend upon the extent of right[s] under the acts respecting 
copyright, and have no analogy to the exclusive rights in the 
author of unpublished compositions, which depend entirely upon 
the common law right of property. 119 
2 
In the United States, Congress first exercised its 
constitutional authority to "secur(e] for limited Times to 
Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings" 10 
when it enacted the first copyright statute in 1790. 11 In Folsom 
v. Marsh, 12 Justice Story formulated the first definitive 
statement on fair use in American copyright law. The case 
involved a claim of infringement in the copying of certain 
letters of George Washington in a two-volume work on Washington 
written by Rev. Charles Upham. The letters were copied from the 
twelve-volume work of Jared Sparks, who originally edited, 
copyrighted and published them. Sparks and Chief Justice 
Marshall had obtained the letters from Justice Bushrod 
Washington, nephew of the first president. In his opinion, 
Justice Story discussed the justifiable uses of copyrighted works 
and developed some factors to be considered in determining 
whether there has been an infringement. Those factors -- the 
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value 
of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may 
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the 
objects of the original work 13 -- were to be echoed in the 
Copyright Act of 1976. 14 
The distinction between common law and statutory copyright 
protection was carried over to American law from the law of 
England . 15 Common law copyright attached to a work from creation 
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to publication or dissemination, and was enforceable in the state 
courts. 16 As was true under British law, the defense of fair use 
was not considered applicable to unpublished material. 17 The 
1976 Copyright Act changed all that. Or so it seemed. Common 
law copyright, often referred to as the right of first 
publication, was preempted by the new statute. 18 The doctrine of 
fair use was codified and made applicable for the first time to 
all copyrighted work, published and unpublished, without 
distinction.. According to the Act, "fair use of a copyrighted 
work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching ... , scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. 1119 In determining whether the use 
made of a work in a particular case is fair, courts are 
constrained to consider four factors: purpose and character of 
the use; nature of the copyrighted work; amount and 
substantiality of the portion used; and effect of the use on the 
potential market for the copyrighted work. 20 
A persuasive case is made in the leading treatise on fair 
use for the proposition "that Congress intended to continue the 
common law prohibition against fair use of unpublished but not 
voluntarily disseminated works. 1121 There is, of course, no 
specific statutory language supporting the proposition, which is 
founded in a review of the legislative history of the 1976 Act. 
The legislative history referred to is derived from the reports 
4 
several committees of Congress, including one expressing a 
congressional intent to "restate the present judicial doctrine of 
fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way. "22 
The treatise refers to this and other evidence as providing 
support for the notion that the fair use doctrine is intended to 
apply only to unpublished works that are publicly disseminated, 
the same as at common law. 23 Apparently, public dissemination is 
thought to involve a deliberate choice to make a work available 
to others, short of actual publication. The public performance 
of unpublished plays and an author's delivery of an unpublished 
manuscript to a critic are given as examples of voluntary 
dissemination. 24 Publication is defined by statute as "the 
distribution of copies ... of a work to the public" as well as 
"[t]he offering to distribute copies ... to a group of persons 
for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or 
public display . . A public performance or display of a work 
does not of itself constitute publication." 25 The distinction 
between publication and public dissemination is very slight 
indeed. 
In Harpe~ & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 26 
the Supreme Court was presented with a clear opportunity to 
eliminate unpublished works from the reach of fair use. That it 
did not do so was attributable solely to the language of the 
Copyright Act. Unquestioned in Harper & Row was the trial 
5 
court's finding that the defendant "knowingly exploited a 
purloined manuscript." 27 The manuscript in question was, of 
course, the memoirs of President Ford. Excerpts of the memoirs 
were scheduled to appear in Time magazine one week before the 
full length book was to be distributed by the plaintiff 
publishing house. Before either scheduled event transpired, 
simple theft allowed the defendant to print and distribute the 
words of President Ford, describing the pardon of Richard Nixon, 
in its publication. In reversing the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals and holding the plaintiff entitled to damages, the Court 
concluded "that the unpublished nature of a work is '[a] key, 
though not necessarily determinative, factor' tending to negate a 
defense of fair use. " 28 Al though the Court analyzed the facts of 
the case in terms of the four statutory fair use factors, it held 
that "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, the author's right to 
control the first public appearance of his undisseminated 
expression will outweigh a claim of fair use. 029 I suggest that 
the vague and undefined phrase, "under ordinary circumstances," 
leaves open a window that should be closed by Congress. The 
window is open only because the Copyright Act presently no 
distinction for fair use purposes between copyrighted material 
that is published or disseminated and copyrighted material that 
is unpublished or undisseminated. It is a window through which a 
thief may enter. 
6 
In the wake of Harper & Row, the courts have been faced with 
some thorny problems in deciding whether various uses of 
unpublished, copyrighted material were used fairly within the 
intendment of the Copyright Act. For example, in Salinger v. 
Random House, Inc., 30 a case involving the copying of letters of 
J.D. Salinger by a biographer who gained access to the letters by 
promising not to copy them, the appeals court panel puzzled over 
the "ambiguity arising from the Supreme Court's observation that 
'the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished 
works.'" 31 The conclusion was that the Court meant it was less 
likely that fair use would apply to unpublished than published 
matter, and not merely that a lesser quantity of material may be 
copied in the case of unpublished matter. It is interesting to 
note that at least some of the biographer's copying was motivated 
by a desire to avoid writing what he called "pedestrian 
sentence[s]. " 32 If you can lift the word images and stylistic 
devices of J.D. Salinger, why bother creating your own? 
The extensive use of an unpublished paper "purloined from 
the Princeton library1133 presented a District Judge with yet 
another twist in the defense of fair use. A copy of the 
dealing with the Pahlevi restoration in Iran, arrived at the 
library as part of the files of Allen Dulles, to whom it was sent 
by the author. Researchers at the library were afforded notice 
of possible liability for copyright infringement and agreed that 
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permission to reproduce was required. The user claimed that he 
was entitled to copy large parts of the author's paper in order 
to provide his book with an "air of authenticity" and "full 
flavor." 34 He contended also that the "ordinary circumstances" 
rule did not apply because the paper copied was fact rather than 
fiction, the author of the paper had given copies to certain 
persons, and the paper and the book were designed to serve 
different purposes. 35 The district court rejected all these 
contentions, applied the statutory fair use factors and found the 
user liable for infringement. 
An action to enjoin the publication of the biography of L. 
Ron Hubbard, deceased founder of the Church of Scientology, 
presented another occasion for an attempt to define further the 
imprecise parameters of the doctrine of fair use as it pertains 
to unpublished material. The material was the product of the pen 
of Hubbard himself, and the unpublished writings in question, a 
certain diary in particular, were almost certainly acquired from 
the Church of Scientology by misappropriation or conversion. 36 
Although the district court ultimately decided to award damages 
for infringement, it accepted the infringer's contention that 
there is greater justification in using unpublished work to make 
a point about the character of the work's author (as was the case 
in the Hubbard biography) than to display the distinctiveness of 
a writing style (as was the case in the Salinger biography). 
8 
In dictum, the panel majority of the appeals court found the 
distinction between use to enliven text and use to communicate 
certain traits of character "unnecessary and unwarranted:" the 
biography clearly was a work of criticism, scholarship or 
research, the purpose of use factor therefore weighed in favor of 
the copier, and this distinction was considered superfluous. 37 
The dissent from denial of in bane consideration in the case 
found significance in the fact that the Supreme Court never has 
expressly rejected the "distinction between copying expression to 
enliven the copier's prose and doing so where necessary to report 
a fact accurately and fairly. " 38 As the author of the panel 
majority opinion and the opinion concurring in the denial of 
rehearing in bane, I continue to "question whether judges, rather 
than literary critics, should decide whether literary material is 
used to enliven text or demonstrate truth." 39 In my opinion, 
"[i]t is far too easy for one author to use another author's work 
on the pretext it is copied for the latter purpose rather than 
the former. 1140 The issue is not yet definitely resolved in the 
Second Circuit because affirmance of the judgment of the district 
court in the case, New Era Publications v. Henry Holt & Co., was 
based on laches, rather than on the type of use to which the 
converted material was put. 41 
Certain elements of the intellectual property bar hold the 
firm belief that the window of fair use should be opened even 
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wider than permitted by Harper & Row for access to unpublished 
and undisseminated material. These elements apparently are not 
at all offended by the notion of exploiting a manuscript pilfered 
by a burglar from an author's locked desk drawer, provided the 
exploitation furthers a just and worthy cause. That federal 
judges are intended to decide what causes are good and just 
should be a matter of some concern. Many critics base their 
positions on First Amendment arguments. One commentator has 
written that "[t]he nature of the accomodation [sic] between 
copyright principles and First Amendment principles remains to be 
drafted. 1142 Yet the Supreme Court in Harper & Row noted "that 
copyright's idea/expression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional 
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by 
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an 
author's expression. '" 43 The commentator merely chooses to 
disregard the accommodation already identified by the Supreme 
Court. 
The authors of an article describing the doctrine of fair 
use as "the biographer's bane" condemn the severe limitations on 
copying unpublished works protected by copyright as a Hdangerous 
rule of interpretation."" They refer to language in Salinger 
"unpublished works . . . normally enjoy complete protection 
against copying any protected expression" 45 -- as an 
"overstatement 1146 of the Harper & Row standard: "[u]nder 
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ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the first 
public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh 
a claim of fair use." 47 It is difficult to discern how the 
language in Salinger is anything other than a restatement of the 
standard in Harper & Row. The same authors find much to 
criticize in New Era, finding that it "ignore[s] the explicit 
congressional mandate that the equities must be flexibly balanced 
case by case" 48 in favor of elevating the single fact of 
unpublished status "to an almost insurmountable obstacle to a 
successful fair use defense. 1149 But there is nothing in New Era 
to indicate that the congressional mandate to apply the fair use 
factors in the case of unpublished works is to be ignored. There 
is merely a reiteration of the principle that the unpublished 
nature of a work is to weigh heavily in the balance and a 
faithful adherence to the "under ordinary circumstances" language 
employed by the Supreme Court. 
It is surely an exaggeration to say, as does one 
commentator, that "[b]iographers are now virtually precluded from 
publishing convincing, critical portraits backed up by limited 
use of the subject's !!_!!Published writings to rebut a too polished 
public persona. " 50 It simply is an incorrect statement of law to 
say, as does the same commentator, that we have come to a point 
"where property rights -- albeit intellectual property rights 
embodied in the Copyright Act, which protects the manner of 
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expression of ideas or facts, takes precedence over the First 
Amendment, which prevents the monopolization or privatization of 
facts or ideas." 51 The Supreme Court has held specifically that 
the protections of the First Amendment are "already embodied in 
the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression 
and uncopyrightable facts and ideas." 52 As to the fair use 
doctrine in particular, the commentator candidly concedes as 
accurate the statement that the "'doctrine encompasses all claims 
of first amendment in the copyright field,'" 53 but disagrees 
with it. Even so, it is difficult to know why he considers that 
a "chill wind now blows through ... editorial offices, 1154 in 
view of the unlimited right to use facts and ideas, published and 
unpublished, copyrighted and uncopyrighted; the limited right to 
use copyrighted, published material, and the severely limited 
right to use copyrighted, unpublished material. My thesis is 
that the delicate balance between the public interest and private 
rights should be restored by a return to earlier law through the 
total elimination of the right to the fair use of material that 
is unpublished or undisseminated. 
An understanding of this thesis requies an examination of 
the policy underlying copyright law and the doctrine of fair use. 
The Supreme Court teaches that the purpose of copyright is to 
stimulate creativity for the public good through the incentive of 
a fair return for an author's labor. 55 The concept of advancing 
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the public wel by encouraging individual effort through 
personal gain is said to drive the Patents and Copyrights clause 
of the Constitution. 56 The Supreme Court reminds us "that the 
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free 
expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of 
one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to 
create and disseminate ideas .. " 57 The fair use doctrine, 
described as an "equitable rule of reason," 58 was developed by 
the courts to provide some elasticity in situations where the 
copyright law might tend to inhibit authors from creating new 
works by building on older works. Strict application of 
copyright in such situations would defeat incremental progress, 
to the detriment of the public good. My colleague, Judge Posner, 
suggests that Shakespeare, who was known to borrow plot, 
character and actual language from existing works, might be 
stifled by our copyright law. 59 Positing a return to the theory 
of creative imitation of Shakespeare's day, Judge Posner notes 
that the extensive expansion of fair use that would be required 
not only would be difficult to define but would very adversely 
affect the author whose work was usect. 60 Although he finds 
thriving literature before there was such a thing as copyright, 
the reasons he gives for the phenomenon -- the low cost of 
writing, non-monetary rewards, and the high cost of copying 
have little relevance to modern times. 61 
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It is difficult to understand how the expansion of fair use 
of unpublished works that some espouse would serve the purpose of 
present-day copyright law. Not unexpectedly, an editorial in The 
Nation recently advocated that "Congress should indicate its 
displeasure with and disapproval of the recent rulings, beginning 
with the Nation case, which deviate so far from the way politics 
and history are and necessarily ought to be written. " 62 The 
Nation's specific proposal was to amend the Copyright Act to 
provide that "unpublished material shall be treated the same way 
as published works have heretofore been treated" for fair use 
purposes. 63 Apparently, it would make no difference to The 
Nation whether or not the unpublished material was stolen. The 
statutory amendment proposed in the editorial, contrary to its 
purported goal, would not serve the public purpose because it 
would not encourage the efforts of authors. That an unpublished, 
undisseminated, copyrighted work is of historical significance 
and "deserving of unfettered public discussion" 64 does not mean 
that the public may take from that work whatever it will. 
As has been demonstrated, the present "open window" for fair 
use of unpublished material has given rise to much uncertainty. 
It allows for the exploitation of stolen text. It has spawned 
proposals for fair use analysis under market theory guidelines, 65 
redevelopment of the fair use doctrine predicated in part on a 
utopian theory, 66 and evaluation of the unpublished nature of 
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the work on a fact/fiction scale. 67 A rule that would disallow 
the exploitation of purloined work, dispel the uncertainty 
attributable to the open window, and eliminate the need to revise 
the doctrine of fair use as applied to unpublished works is a 
rule that prohibits absolutely any copying of unpublished or 
undisseminated works. 
It cannot be gainsaid that an author should have the right 
and the opportunity to hone, polish, refine, revise or discard 
his or her work prior to publication. The author should also 
have the right to withhold the work from public dissemination 
just as long as he or she deems it proper to do so. Implicated 
in these rights are notions of privacy, 68 freedom to refrain from 
speaking, 69 and an author's control of his or her own material. 70 
If information can be considered property under certain 
circumstances, 71 an unpublished and undisseminated manuscript, 
duly copyrighted, should be considered the property of the author 
and subject to the protection of the law. 72 
To the argument that the copying of unpublished material 
must be allowed for reasons of public health, safety or 
welfare, 73 the short response is that copyright protection does 
not extend to any fact or idea embodied in a copyrighted work. 74 
To the assertion that the retention of unpublished, copyrighted 
papers for 50 to 100 years, 75 immune from fair use, is at "cross-
purposes" with the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 76 the 
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answer is the same. The freedom of access to facts and ideas is 
the history of democracy. The right of ownership in intellectual 
property is quite another thing. Interestingly enough, it 
appears that an author whose work is protected under the 
recently-ratified Berne Convention 77 is entitled to protection 
from any use of an unpublished work. 78 The Convention provides 
that: 
[i]t shall be permissible to make 
quotations from a work which already has been 
made available to the public, provided that 
their making is compatible with fair 
practice, and their extent does not e~feed 
that justified by the purpose . . . . 
Unpublished material would seem to be excluded from "fair 
practice," and a violation of "moral rights" may be implicated in 
any use of such materia1. 80 
My thesis accounts for the concern of scholars that a denial 
of fair use for unpublished works would be "most inappropriate 
for the great majority of letters and memorabilia whose authors 
are no longer alive." 81 It does so by allowing use of the 
factual content of letters and memorabilia. 82 It also does so by 
deeming letters to be voluntarily disseminated to the public when 
they are received by the addressees. The generally accepted 
concept that the author of the letter retains the ownership of 
the intellectual property, while the recipient acquires ownership 
of the physical property, allows public display of the letter by 
the recipient. 83 There is no great leap in logic to consider 
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that, in writing and sending letters, authors have agreed to a 
dissemination of their correspondence to the public. Voluntary 
public dissemination was, of course, the same as publication for 
the purpose of losing the common law copyright protection that 
applied to unpublished matter under the old dual system of 
copyright. 84 Historians, as well as authors, scholars, 
journalists and researchers should have no quarre1 85 with a rule 
that permits the fair use of copyrighted letters, wherever such 
letters are found, to the same extent that they are afforded fair 
use of published or publicly disseminated matter. 
The Framers of our Constitution long ago foresaw the need to 
maintain balances in the republic they created: the balance 
between individual rights and public needs; the balance of 
authority between state and national governments; and the balance 
entailed in the separation of powers in the federal government. 
In the area of intellectual property, they foresaw a need to 
maintain a balance between the rights of authors and inventors 
and the rights of society. 86 They therefore empowered the 
Congress to establish and maintain that balance by assuring that 
writers and inventors have exclusive rights, but only for a 
limited time, in their writings and discoveries. The balance 
contemplated cannot be established or maintained unless Congress 
affords to authors the assurance that their copyrighted work 
cannot be used in any manner whatsoever prior to publication or 
voluntary and public dissemination. 
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